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1 Non-technical Summary
Politics has long been recognized as a major determinant of exchange rates. However,
political risk is notoriously difficult to quantify. To overcome this hurdle, the recent
literature has privileged breadth relative to depth, proposing indices of political uncer-
tainty that aggregate over multiple sources of primary information, mainly from the press,
and count the frequency by which a number of keywords, such as uncertainty, economy,
deficit, tax policy, appear. This paper takes the opposite approach. We focus on a major
recent political event—the Brexit Referendum in Great Britain—for which the response
of currencies to political risk can be measured directly.
The Brexit Referendum has shaken the European and international political scene
in 2016: for the first time a European Union (EU) member country, the UK, voted
for leaving the Union. Indeed, with the unexpected victory of the “Leave” camp, the
British Pound (BP) depreciated overnight by about 7% against the Euro and other main
currencies. What makes the Brexit Referendum an interesting “natural experiment” for
economists is that political risk can be measured with precision, because the event has
been preceded by an exceptionally liquid betting market. Bookmakers, such as Betfair
and PredictIt, provided online platforms on which individuals could bet on the likely
outcome of the Referendum in real time. From the bookmakers’ odds, we can extract a
daily series of the probability of Brexit and derive the “correct” measure of the political
uncertainty associated with the Referendum result.
In the paper we ask a number of questions. The first is whether, and why, the evolution
in the Leave probability is associated to movements in the price of currencies. To answer,
we write down a simple model where risk-neutral investors form expectations about post-
Referendum exchange rates, and where these expectations depend of their assessment
of the Leave/Remain probabilities. In our benchmark estimates, we find that markets
expected a depreciation of the BP against a basket of major currencies of approximately
20% in case of a Leave victory.
Our second question is whether there is evidence that currency markets price a po-
litical risk premium. We extend the model by allowing investors to be risk-averse, and
from the Leave probabilities we derive a formula for the premium associated to political
risk. The estimates suggest that when the political risk factor increases the BP tends to
depreciate with respect to all the currencies considered, since investors reallocate their
investments to less risky assets.
Thus, as the probability of a Leave outcome increases, the BP depreciates due to
two effects. The first operates via expectations: a more likely Leave outcome induces
2
investors to expect a future depreciation after the Referendum, so that the exchange rate
weakens immediately. The second works trough the political risk premium: as the Leave
probability gets closer to 50%, investing in BP becomes riskier and investors re-allocate
their portfolios away from it.
Relating time-varying political risk and exchange rates is especially important in
the context of the so-called “Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) anomaly”, which refers to
the puzzle that the spread between the domestic and the foreign-currency denominated
assets tends to be either weakly or negatively correlated to the depreciation rate of the
domestic currency, particularly at short maturities and for low-inflation countries, and
so borrowing in the the low-rate currency and investing in the high-rate one—the so-
called carry trade—allows investors to realize possibly unbounded profits. Thus, our
third question is whether measuring political risk directly helps to reconcile the exchange
rate behavior with the UIP. In this case, the empirical results are more nuanced, but go
in the direction of reconciling the data with the theory.
Our last question is whether our portfolio framework can improve on the standard
approach that considers exchange rates in isolation. Indeed, we find that the model’s
restrictions are not rejected by the data and that they help reconciling the data with the
UIP condition of arbitrage—especially for the EU and the US.
2 Introduction
Politics has long been recognized as a major determinant of the international price of
currencies. However, political risk is notoriously difficult to quantify. To overcome this
hurdle, recent work has privileged breadth relative to depth, proposing indices of politi-
cal uncertainty that aggregate over multiple sources of primary information to generate
widely applicable and relatively long time series (e.g., Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016)).
In order to complement this literature and to dig into the mechanism by which politi-
cal risk is priced, this paper takes the opposite approach. It focuses on a major recent
political event—the Brexit Referendum in Great Britain—for which the response of cur-
rencies to time-varying political risk can be measured directly. Our findings confirm that
a time-varying political risk premium plays a crucial role in exchange rate determina-
tion. Moreover, our theory-based methodology identifies the premium from economic
fundamentals, and can be applied to the analysis of other political events.
The Brexit Referendum has shaken the European and international political scene
in 2016: for the first time a European Union (EU) member country, the UK, voted for
leaving the Union. The debate in the run-up to the Referendum focused mainly on in-
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concerns that the City of London would lose its role as the main market for Euro denom-
inated assets (e.g., Reuters, 2016). Indeed, with the unexpected victory of the “Leave”
camp, the British Pound (BP) depreciated overnight by about 7% against the Euro and
other main currencies.
What makes the Brexit Referendum an interesting “natural experiment”, where po-
litical risk can be measured with some precision, is that the event has been preceded
by an exceptionally liquid betting market.2 Bookmakers, such as Betfair and PredictIt,
provided online platforms on which individuals could bet on the likely outcome of the
Referendum in real time. From the bookmakers’ odds, we can extract a daily series of
the (risk neutral) probability of Brexit. With the benefit of hindsight the level of political
odds has been criticized, as it failed to predict the outcome,3 however we note that the
informativeness of the odds-implied probabilities should not be measured by the accu-
racy of their levels, but rather by their ability to track changes through time, which is
captured by our time-series regressions. Thus, our  } ‘ b i  [ m 2 b i B Q M is whether, and why,
the evolution in the odds-implied Leave probability before the Referendum is associated
to movements in the price of the British Pound in terms of other currencies.
To answer, we start by writing down a simple model where risk-neutral investors
form expectations about post-Referendum exchange rates. In the absence of arbitrage
opportunities, the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) should hold, and the interest rate on
a domestic currency-denominated asset should exceed the foreign one when the domestic
currency is expected to depreciate. We extend the UIP condition allowing the expected
depreciation to depend on the (time-varying) probability of Leave. We then take this
model to the data, and find that, consistent with the post-Referendum outcomes, market
participants expected the British Pound to depreciate against all major currencies upon
a victory of the Leave campaign. In particular, our benchmark estimates suggest that
the markets expected a depreciation of the BP against a basket of major currencies of
approximately 20% in case of a Leave victory, regardless of whether the basket is weighted
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While the odds-implied probability can be used to estimate the expected effect of
Brexit on exchange rates (first moment), it also provides the basis to construct a time-
varying political risk premium (second moment). Intuitively, the closer the odds-implied
probability gets to one half, the closer the political risk faced by market participants gets
to its peak, in a non-linear fashion. Thus, we can extend the model allowing the marginal
investor in the currency market to be risk-averse, and derive a closed form solution for
the time-varying risk premium, as a non-linear function of the Leave probability. Our
 b 2 + Q M /  [ m 2 b i B Q Mis whether there is evidence that currency markets price our (model-
based) measure of political risk premium.
The answer turns out to be clearly positive. Our political risk factor is positively
and highly significantly associated to the BP price of a basket of other currencies and to
bilateral exchange rates, with the exception of the BP-Japanese Yen, irrespective of the
sample period considered and of the estimation method employed. Thus, as the probabil-
ity of a Leave outcome increases, the BP depreciates due to two effects. The first operates
via expectations: a more likely Leave outcome induces investors to expect a future de-
preciation after the Referendum, so that the exchange rate weakens immediately.5 The
second works trough the political risk premium: as the Leave probability gets closer to
50%, investing in the BP becomes riskier and investors re-allocate their portfolios away
from it.
The significance of our direct measure of the time-varying political risk factor comple-
ments the recent work that stresses the importance of political uncertainty by studying
aggregate indices (e.g., Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), Pastor and Veronesi (2012), Bro-
gaard and Detzel (2015), Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester and Rubio-
Ramírez (2015) and Kelly, Pástor and Veronesi (2016)), in a setting where the definition
of political risk is derived from the theory and can be measured from the bookmakers’
odds—a market price that conveys the ‘wisdom of the crowd’. Other related work on
the price of political uncertainty has either focused on tax policies (Sialm (2009), Croce,
Nguyen and Schmid (2012)), or on equity premia (Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003),
Belo, Gala and Li (2013), Bittlingmayer (1998), Voth (2003), and Boutchkova, Doshi,
Durnev and Molchanov (2012)).
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In addition, our results relate to the vast literature on exchange rates. While recent
work analyzed the pricing of macroeconomic uncertainty in currency markets (e.g., Rossi
and Sekhposyan (2015)), the role of political uncertainty has been largely overlooked. To
our knowledge, the only exception is Bachman (1992), who studies the impact of political
news (elections) on the time-varying risk premium in foreign exchange markets. Before
an election, there is uncertainty on whether the new government will implement a policy
(a tax on domestic assets) which affects the domestic interest rate. This uncertainty is
resolved after the elections. As a result, the parameters of an exchange rate equation
should be unstable: those estimated in the sample before the elections should differ
significantly from those in the post-election period. The author considers 13 election
episodes in Canada, US, France and UK and finds evidence of parameter instability for
about half of the episodes. Unlike Bachman (1992), we do not limit ourselves to testing
for structural breaks, but we estimate the effects of time-varying political uncertainty on
the exchange rate parameters.
Relating time-varying political risk and exchange rates is especially important in the
context of the so-called “UIP anomaly”, which refers to the puzzle that while the arbitrage
condition predicts that the domestic interest rate should rise to compensate an expected
depreciation of the domestic currency, the spread between the domestic and the foreign-
currency denominated assets is typically found to be either weakly or negatively correlated
to the depreciation rate of the domestic currency, particularly at short maturities and
for low-inflation countries (see Fama (1984), Hodrick (1987), Froot and Frankel (1989),
Burnside et al. (2006), Chinn and Quayyum (2012), Engel (2014) and Ismailov and Rossi
(2018)), and so borrowing in the the low-rate currency and investing in the high-rate
one—the so-called carry trade—allows investors to realize possibly unbounded profits.
The literature on exchange rates has tried to rationalize the puzzle either by positing
a time-varying risk premium (e.g., Fama (1984), Verdelhan (2010), Lustig et al. (2011),
Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), Farhi and Gabaix (2015)), or deviating from standard,
rational preferences and beliefs (e.,g., Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Burnside et al.
(2011), Ilut (2012)). In our paper, we do not make assumptions about the co-movement of
exchange rate expectations and risk premia: we can measure it directly from bookmakers’
odds.
Thus, our third question is whether measuring political risk directly helps to recon-
cile the exchange rate behavior with the UIP. Interestingly, the theoretical model implies
that the “true” political risk-premium should co-move with the exchange rate exactly in
the way required by Fama (1984) to explain the UIP puzzle.
In this case, the empirical results are encouraging. On the one hand, both for the
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basket of currencies and for the major trading partners of the UK (i.e., the US and the
EU), we find that the spread between the domestic and the foreign-currency denominated
assets tends to be positively correlated to the depreciation rate of the domestic currency, as
the UIP requires. On the other, we often observe a higher coefficient than that predicted
by the UIP, although the standard errors are too large to rule out that the coefficient is
one (as required by the theory). Moreover, consistent with the previous literature, such
coefficients seems to be quite unstable across samples and specifications, at least when we
proceed estimating single equation models, currency by currency. Interestingly, the UIP
performs much better when we take into account the cross-equation restrictions implied
by the portfolio choice model and when we expand the sample period (see below).
It has also been extensively argued that testing the UIP might fail for econometric
reasons. This may be either because a random walk model for the exchange rate typically
outperforms structural models in terms of out-of-sample forecasts (see Meese and Rogoff
(1983a,b), Cheung, Chinn and Pascual (2005), Alquist and Chinn (2008)), or because of
hard-to-predict rare catastrophic currency crashes (Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen
(2008), Farhi and Gabaix (2015)), or because of biases in the standard errors (Baillie and
Bollerslev (2000), Rossi (2006)), or because of small sample biases (Chinn and Meredith
(2005), Chinn and Quayyum (2012), and Chen and Tsang (2013)), or due to time-varying
volatility (e.g., Clarida et al. (2009), Menkhoff et al. (2012))
This leads to our fourth question, which is whether it is possible to improve on
the standard approach of estimating single-equation exchange rate models by consider-
ing a simultaneous, multi-currency setting. In this respect, one interesting property of
our portfolio-choice approach is that it can easily be extended to a setting in which in-
vestors choose between more than two currencies. The model helps us to identify one
cross-equation restriction that should hold and improve the efficiency of the estimates.
This restriction derives from two considerations: first, the coefficient of risk-aversion of
the marginal investor should not vary systematically across currency-pairs; second, the
optimal share of every currency in the portfolio should depend on the entire co-variance
structure of exchange rates. Indeed, when estimating a dynamic Seemingly-Unrelated-
Regressions (SUR) system, we find that our restriction is not rejected by the data, while
the coefficients on both odds and odds-volatility remain similar and statistically signifi-
cant for most countries. Moreover, relative to the currency-pair regression in isolation,
the SUR estimates are more often significant and the UIP parameter of the interest rate
differential is much closer to the theoretical value—especially for the EU and the US.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. First, we
assume risk neutrality. Then, we introduce risk-aversion and consider a simple mean-
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presents the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy, and presents the empirical
results. The section also includes a number of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
 j  h ? 2  J Q / 2 H
In this section we lay out our reference model. We use the model to show that the
parameters of the UIP condition must reflect the expectations of future exchange rates
and are not “structural”. We start from a risk-neutral setting, and then we introduce risk-
aversion. This allows us to derive a time-varying political risk premium, as a function of
observables. We then discuss two extensions. In the first one we add another source of
political uncertainty in the pre-Referendum period, which reflects the possibility that the
Referendum may or may not be called. This extension shows that equations parameters
may exhibit jumps when important sources of uncertainty are resolved. The second
extension considers a portfolio model with many currencies. This model implies that
the parameters of different currencies are not independent and should satisfy a simple
cross-equation restriction that we test on our data.
 j X R  _ B b F @ L 2 m i ‘  H B i v -  h r Q  * m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b
This section develops the simplest framework where we can discuss exchange rate move-
ments around the resolution of uncertainty of a major political event, such as the Brexit
referendum. We denote by i and i* the domestic (UK) and foreign interest rates, which
apply on assets denominated in the respective currencies.6 These assets are issued before,
and mature after, the date of the Referendum. The (natural logarithm of) the nominal
exchange rates before and after the resolution of uncertainty on the Referendum outcome
are denoted by e and e’, respectively, and both are expressed as units of the domestic
currency (BP) for one unit of foreign currency. The UIP condition states that the dif-
ference between the interest rates of a domestic and foreign-currency denominated asset
must equal expected depreciation, and can be written as follows:
e = i∗ − i+ E(e′). (1)
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where E denotes the expectation operator. For now, we assume that a Referendum
will certainly take place. Given that there are only two possible outcomes of the vote,
V={Leave (L), Remain (R)}, the exchange rate which is expected to prevail after the
vote is:
E(e′) = piE(e′|L) + (1− pi)E(e′|R), (2)
where E(e′|V ) represents the expected exchange rate conditional on the vote V, and pi is
the ex-ante probability of a Leave vote. Substituting the previous definition into equation
(1) yields:
e = i∗ − i+ pi [(E(e′|L))− (E(e′|R))] + E(e′|R). (3)
Assume that the probability of a Leave outcome can be observed—for instance, from
betting odds posted by risk-neutral wagerers. Then, a linear regression of the exchange
rate on the foreign-domestic spread and on the odds probability yields:
e = θ(i∗ − i) + α + βpi, (4)
where equation (3) implies the following:
α = E(e′|R), (5)
β = E(e′|L)− E(e′|R), (6)
θ = 1. (7)
The intercept parameter α in the regression is the market’s expectation of the future
exchange rate conditional on a Remain victory, and the sum of the estimates of the inter-
cept and slope coefficients α + β = E(e′|L) gives the expected exchange rate conditional
on a Leave victory. A positive (negative) estimate of the coefficient β implies that the
exchange rate is expected to exhibit a jump depreciation (appreciation) after the Ref-
erendum if the Leave outcome prevails. The probability of Leave pi takes the value one
after the Referendum date, as this source of political uncertainty gets resolved.
3.2 Risk-Aversion, Two Currencies
In this section we assume that investors are risk averse and derive a precise measure
of the political risk premium. Consider a representative foreign (i.e., non-UK) investor
who chooses between investing in its own currency denominated asset, which is safe, or
in a BP denominated asset, which is risky because of exchange rate fluctuations. The
portfolio choice occurs before the resolution of uncertainty on the Brexit Referendum, as
9
 i ? 2   b b 2 i b  K  i m ‘ 2   7 i 2 ‘  i ? 2  p Q i 2 X  G 2 i  i ? 2  T  Q ‘ i 7 Q H B Q  b ?  ‘ 2  i ?  i  B b  B M p 2 b i 2 /  B M  i ? 2  l E  #  2
ω. For simplicity, we consider standard mean-variance preferences, so that the investor
chooses ω in order to maximize:
U(ω) = (1− ω)i∗ + ω [i− (E(e′)− e)]− r
2
ω2σ2, (8)
where r ≥ 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion and σ2 is the portfolio variance.
In equation (8), the first term on the right side represents the return on the risk-free
non-UK (safe) investment, i∗, while the second term represent the expected return on
the UK (risky) investment, given by the sum of the interest rate i and the expected
appreciation of the BP. Each term is weighted by its respective portfolio share. The last
term in the utility function is the product of the risk-aversion parameter r
2
multiplied by
the (squared) share of UK assets times the risk on the portfolio return, σ2.7 The portfolio
variance reads:
σ2 = piE[e′|L]2 + (1− pi)E[e′|R]2 − (piE[e′|L] + (1− pi)E[e′|R])2
= pi(1− pi)[E[e′|L]− E[e′|R]]2
= pi(1− pi)β2 (9)
Equation (9) shows that the portfolio variance coincides with the volatility of the exchange
rate. This volatility increases with the difference between the expected exchange rates
conditional on the two possible outcomes, β (see (6)), and reaches a maximum when the
Leave/Remain probabilities are the same, or pi = 1
2
. From the first-order condition, the
optimal portfolio share of UK-denominated investments reads:
ω =
i− (E[e′]− e)− i∗
rσ2
. (10)
Intuitively, the share in BP denominated assets is an increasing function of the difference
between the UK and the foreign expected yields. With risk-averse investors–i.e., r > 0—
the share of BP denominated assets is decreasing in the portfolio volatility σ2 and in the
degree of risk-aversion. We can solve for the exchange rate e by assuming that the asset
market clears, so that the demand for foreign assets (ω) equals supply (s), that we take
as exogenous.8 Substituting ω = s in (10) and solving for the exchange rate we obtain a
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e = θ(i∗ − i) + α + βpi + γpi(1− pi), (11)
where:
α = E[e′|R] > 0, β = E[e′|L]− E[e′|R], γ = rβ2s ≥ 0, θ = 1.
This expression generalizes equation (4) for the case of risk aversion, with the addition of
a time-varying risk premium given by rσ2s = rpi(1− pi)β2s. This premium is increasing
in the equilibrium portfolio share of BP (that is, s) in the coefficient of absolute risk-
aversion (r), and in the volatility of the portfolio return (σ2). The risk-premium will be
time-varying as long as the probability of Leave, pi, changes over time.
Note that a marginal increase in the Leave probability (from below 1
2
) now has two
separate effects on the current exchange rate. On the one hand, it implies a rise in
the future expected exchange rate—provided that the investors forecast a weaker BP in
case of Brexit, i.e. β > 0. On the other hand, a larger Leave probability raises the
political uncertainty, leading risk-averse investors to reduce their portfolio share of BP
and further depreciating the exchange rate. Thus, a larger Leave probability pi raises the
current exchange rate e by more than it raises the future expected exchange rate E(e′),
and this overshooting implies an expected appreciation of the currency. As a result, a
change in the Leave probability induces a negativecorrelation between the risk premium
and the expected depreciation rate, as required by Fama (1984) to solve the UIP puzzle.
3.3 Referendum Uncertainty, Two Currencies
In our framework, the parameters of the exchange rate equation α, β and γ depend on
the “deeper” parameters which reflect agents’ information and preferences, and which
may be subject to change when crucial Brexit-related news arrive. We dig further into
this issue by considering an alternative reason for parameter instability: the resolution
of uncertainty on the Referendum itself. To this end, we extend the model by taking a
step backward in time when, following the UK negotiations with the EU, investors were
uncertain on whether a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU would ever be
called. This extension tries to rationalize what happened when the British Parliament
promulgated the so called “Referendum Act” in mid December 2015, which established
the constitutionality of a Referendum on the membership of Great Britain in the EU
and made sure that a vote will be called. As we will discuss later on, three things
happened in the following weeks: currency markets reacted with a sharp depreciation
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of the BP; the different Bookmakers odds on the outcome of the vote, which until then
show little correlation among themselves, started to converge and comove; and finally,
their correlation with exchange rate increased sharply. Let q denote the probability that
a referendum will take place, so that with probability 1− q the Referendum will not take
place, in which case the exchange rate is expected to be E[e′|∅]. In this case, the expected
exchange rate is
E(e′) = (1− q)E[e′|∅] + q JpiE(e′|L) + (1− pi)E(e′|R)K
which is a linear combination of the expected exchange rate conditional on no Referen-
dum, the first term, and the expected exchange rated conditional on the Referendum
taking place. It is easy to show that, in the case of risk neutral investors, the exchange
rate equation is modified as follows:
e = θ(i∗ − i) + α + qδ + qβpi,
where α, β, θ are defined as before and δ = E[e′|R]−E(e′|∅). In particular, if the market
anticipates that the exchange rate that will prevail after a Remain vote will be the same as
the one that would have prevailed had the Referendum not occurred, δ = 0, the equation
simplifies to
e = θ(i∗ − i) + α + qβpi. (12)
Comparing (12) with equation (4) we can see that the coefficient of the Leave probability,
pi, should make a discrete jump from qβ to β at the moment when the Brexit Referendum
is announced. Intuitively, at this moment the effect of the odds on the expected exchange
rate will increase. A similar intuition holds for the portfolio model with risk aversion. In
this case, it is easy to show that introducing uncertainty on the actual occurrence of the
Referendum modifies the exchange rate equation as follows:
e = θ(i∗ − i) + α + qδ + qβpi + γqpi(1− pi), (13)
where the parameters α, β, γ are the same as in (12). This equation shows that also the
coefficient of the risk-premium pi(1−pi) should exhibit a discrete upward jump at the time
of the Referendum announcement. The portfolio variance now reads σ2 = qpi(1− pi)β2.
12
3.4 Risk Aversion, Many Currencies
Our portfolio model immediately generalizes to the case of many currencies, where the
(non-UK) investor can chose between N +1 assets, one denominated in his own currency
and N denominated in foreign currencies, with yields denoted by i, j = 1, . . . , N . The
portfolio weights are denoted by ωj. For simplicity, we consider the case in which the
Referendum is known to take place for sure. Let ej denote the price of currency j in terms
of the investor’s currency. Investing in a currency j entails a currency risk due to the























where the portfolio variance now depends on the weighted sum of all bilateral variances







+ (1− pi) [E[e′i|R]E[e′j|R]] ,





j)− E(e′i)E(e′j) = pi(1− pi)
[
(E[e′i|L]− E[e′i|R]) (E[e′j|L]− E[e′j|R])
]
= pi(1− pi)βiβj.
This expression shows that the covariance between any pair of currencies is equal to the
product of the expected “jumps” β of the two currencies, multiplied by the uncertainty
over the Referendum outcome pi(1 − pi). This extends equation (9) to the case of many
currencies. Proceeding as before, we can calculate the optimal portfolio shares, ωj , and
derive the equilibrium price equations, j = 1, . . . , N satisfying ωj = sj. We obtain:
ej = i






which we can rewrite in compact form as
ej = θ(i
∗ − ij) + αj + βjpi + γ˜pi(1− pi), (14)
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where





sjskβjβk, θ = 1, for j = 1, ..., N
Expression (14) represents a system of N non-linear equations. This system is charac-
terized by a cross-equation restriction on the parameters. The restriction comes from the
fact that, unlike the intercept αj and the slope βj which are country-specific, the coeffi-
cient of the volatility term, γ˜, depends on the expected “jumps” of all the exchange rates
in the portfolio and on the risk-aversion parameter, and should therefore be identical
across currencies.
In this model, the coefficient of the political risk premium term, γ˜, can in principle
be negative, so that the BP would “appreciate” when political risk increases. This would
apply if the British Pound, in case of Leave, were expected to appreciate relative to some
currency j and to depreciate relative to some other currency k, βj < 0, βk > 0. In these
(unlikely) circumstances, investing in BP may entail a diversification benefit which would
reduce exposure to political risk. This extension suggests that imposing the restriction
that the volatility coefficient should be the same across currencies and estimating a system
of equations could improve the efficiency of the estimates.
4 The Data
For the empirical analysis we collected daily data from May 27, 2015, to June 23, 2017
on exchange rates, interest rates, bookmakers odds, as well as other measures of political
and economic uncertainty suggested by previous research. We study the behavior of
the British Pound (BP) vis-à-vis the currencies of a number of major trading partners
among advanced economies: the Euro (EUR), the US Dollar (USA), the Japanese Yen
(JAP), the Swiss Franc (CHE), the Canadian Dollar (CAN), the Danish Krone (DAN),
the Swedish Krone (SWE), the Norwegian Krone (NOR), the Australian Dollar (AUS)
and the New Zealand Dollar (NZL). To this aim, we consider two specifications of a
multilateral nominal exchange rate of the BP against a basket of these ten currencies, as
well as each bilateral exchange rate.
Our first multilateral exchange rate (and the corresponding interest rate differential) is
constructed as a weighted average of the country-specific exchange rates (interest rates),
using trade weights—based on international trade flows between the UK and the other
countries. More specifically, each trade weight is calculated as the ratio of the bilateral
trade (the sum of exports and imports) to the total value of UK trade with the ten
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countries, measured in 2015. We also construct an alternative measure of multilateral
exchange rate based on financial weights. Specifically, for a generic country i, the financial
weight is given by the ratio of the financial position (the sum of assets and liabilities) of
the UK towards country i, relative to the total financial position of the UK against all
the other ten countries, measured as of December 2015.
Table 1 reports the two sets of weights in column 2 and 4, and the value of bilateral
trade and of the bilateral financial position in 2015 in column 1 and 3, respectively. In
both exchange rates the Euro and the USD play a dominant role. The trade-weights
reflect the predominant share of the EU in UK trade (64.3 percent) with a relatively
minor role for the USD (17 percent) and a non-negligible role for the Swiss Franc (6
percent), while financial weights are relatively more balanced, and assign to the Euro
and the USD respectively 46 and 36 percent, and about 6 percent to Japan. The data
source for the exchange rates and interest rates is Datastream. As in Ismailov and Rossi
(2018), the interest rates considered here are 3-month euro LIBOR rates. The source
for international financial positions is the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
(CPIS). International trade data are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
Our Leave probability measure is constructed using real time data provided by two
betting companies: Betfair and PredictIt. For either provider, we take the daily average
probability of Leave derived from the corresponding odds. The probability variable pi
is the average of the two series. We chose to use these data as we consider that these
prediction markets reflect the ‘wisdom of the crowd’. In particular, unlike survey data,
they are immune from misreporting as investors “put their money where their mouth is”.
In the words of Arrow et al. (2008), “because information is often widely dispersed among
economic actors, it is highly desirable to find a mechanism to collect and aggregate that
information. Free markets usually manage this process well because almost anyone can
participate, and the potential for profit (and loss) creates strong incentives to search for
better information”. Prediction markets are used to manage risks—such as flu outbreaks
and environmental disasters—by public entities (e.g., U.S. Department of Defense) as well
as firms (e.g., General Electric, Google, France Telecom, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel,
Microsoft, Siemens, Yahoo).
Betfair is a British online gambling company headquartered in Hammersmith (West
London) and Clonskeagh (Dublin). It claims to have over 4 million customers (1.1 million
active customers) and a turnover in excess of £50 million a week. As of April 2013, the
company employed 1,800 people. In its betting website, Betfair listed two Brexit-related
contracts. The first paid out £1 in the event of a Leave victory, the other paid £1 in
the event of Remain. Betfair supplied us with the odds implicit in the contract prices,
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 ‘ 2 + 2 M i  T  T  2 ‘ b -  2 X ; X -Auld and Linton (2019). We complement this with a second source
for betting odds, the New Zealand-based company PredictIt, which launched a market
on the Brexit vote on November 3, 2014 and caters mainly US-based investors.9
Figure 1 compares the two Leave probability series derived from the Betfair odds
(solid blue line) and the PredictIt ones (dashed green line). The figure reveals that the
Leave probability measures were quite noisy in 2015: until December 2015, the two series
exhibit a negative correlation (-0.35) and the standard deviation of their difference is
9.30%. However, starting in January 2016 the odds appear to behave similarly: for the
period January 1 - June 22 the standard deviation falls to 4.23% and the correlation
coefficient rises to 0.51.
Among a series of relevant political events which marked the run-up to the Referendum
and the progress of UK-EU negotiations, two dates were pivotal, at least according to
the briefing paper by the UK House of Commons Library on Brexit (Walker (2018)): the
first is December 17, 2015—when the EU Referendum Act was promulgated—and the
second is February 22, 2016—when Prime Minister David Cameron announced that the
Referendum would take place on June 23, 2016. The Referendum Act was the act of
the Parliament that made legal provision for a consultative referendum to be held in the
United Kingdom and Gibraltar, on whether the UK should remain a member state of the
European Union or leave it. Following the Royal Assent to the Act, although the Prime
Minister did not indicate a precise date for the vote, the British media considered June
2016 as the most likely period well before David Cameron’s official announcement.10
A dashed vertical line in Figures 1-2 identifies the date (December 17, 2015) on
which the European Union Referendum Act received Royal Assent and was therefore
promulgated.
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Figure 2 plots the average of the two Leave probability series (solid blue line, left
scale) along with the effective exchange rate of the BP against the basket of ten cur-
rencies (dashed yellow line, right scale), using financial weights. Interestingly, around
the approval of the EU Referendum Act, the exchange rate exhibits an upward move-
ment (a depreciation of the BP of approximately 10%), while the correlation between the
two variables increases—it is 0.18 from May 27 to December 17, 2015, it rises to 0.57
in the subsequent period. The graphical evidence and the descriptive statistics suggest
that from late 2015 the odds associated to the bets on the Referendum result may have
played a stronger role in explaining the BP exchange rate movements, consistently with
the implication of our model.
The additional measures of political and economic uncertainty that we collected will be
introduced in the robustness section, as they are not employed in our baseline estimation.
Figure 3 plots all (log) exchange rates considered in this paper, from 27 May 2015 to
23 June 2017. The financially-weighted basket and the trade-weighted basket are denoted
by ROWF and ROWT , respectively (where “ROW” stands for “rest of the world”). The
figure shows that, qualitatively, the BP exhibited similar patterns relative to the curren-
cies considered in the paper, with a large depreciation occurring around the Referendum
Act of mid December 2015.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we estimate a version of the Uncovered Interest Parity relationship implied
by the theoretical model, which emphasizes the role of market expectations and of the
political risk premium that are embodied in the odds of Leave. For this purpose we
focus on the long-run (cointegration) relationship between the exchange rates and its
determinants. We do so for different currencies, sample periods and by employing different
statistical estimators. Thus we leave aside short-run dynamics issues. Estimates of an
Error Correction Model, available upon request, confirm the results presented here and
show that the exchange rates converge over time to this long-run relationship.
5.1 Setup
Based on equation (11), the impact effects of the Leave probability and of the political
risk premium on the exchange rate of the BP may change as a result of a shift in mar-
ket expectations on the future exchange rate. Equation (13) introduces the additional
possibility that these effects may change as the result of a shift in q, the probability of
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 i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  #  2 B M ;  ? 2 H / X11 The approval of the Referendum Act, by removing the un-
certainty over the Referendum, in our interpretation affects the parameter q. Although
we do not directly observe this probability, since there were no betting markets on the
possibility of a vote, we will assume that this parameter takes the value of one after the
date of promulgation of the Act, τ .
Therefore, our approach consists in estimating equation (13) under the assumption
that a discrete upward shift in q occurs at the date of the promulgation of the EU
Referendum Act:
qt =
q0 if t ≤ τ1 if t > τ
with q0 < 1.
We first estimate equation (13) for the effective exchange rate of the BP vis-à-vis our
two baskets of ten currencies (either with financial-weighting or with trade-weighting of
the countries). Next, we proceed to the analysis of country-by-country equations for bilat-
eral exchange rates. Finally, we consider the joint estimation of a multi-currency portfolio
model, allowing for cross-currency shock correlation and cross-equation constraints. Our
benchmark sample spans the period from 27 May 2015, which is the first day when the
odds on the Referendum outcome are available, to 30 June 2016. We include a few days
after the vote for identification purposes. We also estimate the equations on a longer
sample ending in June 2017.
Because the Leave probability never exceeds 50% before the vote, our volatility mea-
sure pi(1 − pi) is a monotonic transformation of pi and the correlation between the two
variables is close to 1. Collinearity would make their individual coefficients not identified
and lead to inaccurate estimates.12 On 24 June 2016, the day after the vote, pi jumps
to 1 and pi(1 − pi) drops to 0, as the Leave camp prevails and uncertainty about the
outcome of the Referendum is resolved. Accordingly, the inclusion of post-referendum
observations helps us to identify β and γ by exploiting the opposite movements of pi and
pi(1 − pi) following the vote. In the robustness section, we will make sure that our esti-
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mated coefficients on pi and pi(1 − pi) do not not simply capture a pre-post Referendum
time effect.
Before presenting the results, we test our variables for the presence of unit roots and
cointegration.
5.2 Unit Roots and Cointegration
Table 2 shows the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots in e
and i∗−i, both over our benchmark sample 5/27/2015-6/30/2016 (“short sample”), which
covers a few days after the Referendum, and over a sample period 5/27/2015-6/23/2017
(“long sample”), in which about half of the observations lie before and half after the
Referendum. We choose to test the (non-)stationarity of the interest spreads, rather
than the individual interest rates, because we will impose the theoretical restriction that
it is the difference of yields that enters the UIP condition. All exchange rates appear to be
non-stationary at any conventional level of significance on both samples. For the interest
rate differentials, the results are more heterogeneous across countries and samples. Both
the average differential based on financial weights and the one based on trade weights
are non-stationary over the long sample, while the test rejects the presence of a unit root
for both over the short sample. The interest rate differential appears non-stationary on
both samples for the Euro area, USA, Japan, Canada and Denmark at the 5% level of
significance, while for the remaining countries the null cannot be rejected in one of the
two samples.
Table 3 shows the results of the ADF test for pi. In this case, the results are reported
for the pre-Referendum sample 5/27/2015-6/22/2016 (for any sample ending after the
Referendum, the test fails to reject the null due to the jump of pi following the vote).
As suggested by Figure 2, the Leave probability is stationary before the Referendum.
In addition, the table presents the results for qpi, using two values for q0 –the perceived
probability of the Referendum prior to the Referendum Act. We will discuss the issue of
how to estimate this parameter in the next paragraphs. For the moment we assume that
this prior can take two values, q0 ∈ {0.25, 0.5}, which turn out to be plausible according
to our estimates. In either case, the unit root hypothesis is not rejected for the interaction
variable qpi. This is the result of the upward shift in q at the time of the promulgation of
the Referendum Act.
Given our specification (13), we test for cointegration between e, i∗ − i, qpi and
qpi(1 − pi), using the Phillips-Ouliaris residual-based test for single equations. The null
hypothesis is that the variables are not cointegrated. As before, we show results for
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q0 ∈ {0.25, 0.5}. The results for q0 = 0.25 are reported in Table 4. At the 10% level
of significance, the test unambiguously indicates cointegration in the case of the effec-
tive exchange rate, both financially-weighted and trade-weighted. Looking at individual
currencies, the evidence is mixed, but on balance it appears mildly consistent with our
hypothesis of cointegration: for all currencies except the Norwegian krone and the Aus-
tralian dollar, the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 10% level of significance in at
least one of the two samples. When we perform the cointegration test assuming q0 = 0.5
(Table 5), it signals cointegration at the 10% level in most cases. The interaction of pi
and pi(1−pi) with q is critical for establishing a cointegration relationship: when the test
is conducted using the variables pi and pi(1− pi), cointegration is generally ruled out.
5.3 Estimation Results.
This section presents our main results. We begin by considering ordinary least squares
(OLS). The OLS estimator is known to be “superconsistent” (i.e., it converges in proba-
bility to the true parameter value at a speed of T , the sample size, rather than the usual
T 1/2) when the variables are non stationary but cointegrated. However, the estimator
has an asymptotically biased and non-normal distribution, and does not allow for stan-
dard inference. Moreover, as noted by Banerjee et al. (1986), the OLS estimator can
suffer from substantial finite sample bias, and cointegration relationships should be in
general estimated through dynamic regressions rather than static regressions. Maddala
and Kim (1998) review the finite sample evidence on estimators of cointegrating vectors
provided in Monte Carlo studies and advice against estimating long-run parameters by
static regressions.
For these reasons, we turn to the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator,
proposed by Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993). We also show results ob-
tained using the fully-modified OLS (FMOLS) proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990).
Unlike the OLS, these estimators are asymptotically efficient in the presence of cointe-
gration and allow for inference on the coefficients of I(1) variables, as their test statistics
have conventional asymptotic distributions. As highlighted by Rossi (2013), cointegration
vectors are typically estimated by DOLS in the literature on exchange rates.
The DOLS estimator applies a parametric correction to the OLS in order to account
for the correlation between residuals and regressors. In practice, the estimator is ob-
tained by augmenting the cointegration regression with lags and leads of first-differenced
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et = θ(i
∗
t − it) + α + βqtpit + γqtpit(1− pit) + δqt +
h∑
j=−l
φ′j∆X t+j + εt (15)
where X t+j ≡ [i∗t+j − it+j, qt+jpit+j, qt+jpit+j(1 − pit+j)]′, for every j, ∆X t+j = X t+j −
X t+j−1, φj is a 3× 1 vector of parameters, for every j, and εt is an error term.
We employ an automatic lag/lead selection based on the Bayesian information cri-
terion. This indicates that only contemporaneous differences should be included in the
regression, regardless of the value of q0. Nevertheless, we also include lags and leads
of order 1 (i.e. l = h = 1) in order to capture more adequately the dynamics of our
dependent variable.
We also employ the FMOLS estimator, which applies a different correction to OLS. It
controls for the correlation between the error term of the cointegrating regression and the
innovations of the regressors using a non-parametric consistent estimate of the long-run
covariance matrix.
Table 6 reports the estimates obtained in the shorter sample by OLS, DOLS, FMOLS
for the financially-weighted effective exchange rate (ROWF ) and the trade-weighted ef-
fective exchange rate (ROWT ). In order to obtain estimates for q0, we actually make use
of non-linear least squares.13
The table shows that the estimated coefficients of the Leave probability and the
political risk premium, β and γ respectively, are both positive and highly significant across
all estimation methods. In our interpretation, β measures the percent BP depreciation
rate that the market prices in the Leave scenario, relative to the Remain scenario. The
value of the BP conditional on Leave is estimated to be around 19%-22% lower than the
value under the Remain scenario. Importantly, a positive coefficient for our measure of
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 H  ‘ B b F  T ‘ 2 K B m K -pi(1 − pi), means that higher Brexit uncertainty is
associated with a BP depreciation. More generally, our approach allows to disentangle
the two channels (first and second moments) by which the odds affect the exchange rate.
For instance, let us consider what the model predicts should happen to the BP after the
Leave victory, using the estimates in the first column of Table 6. Given the average value
of pi (0.3) and pi(1−pi) (0.21) before the Referendum, the model predict a BP depreciation
of about 7 percent. This is the net effect of: (i) the surprise of the Referendum outcome,
which accounts for a depreciation of 14.8% = (1− 0.3) · 0.2112; (ii) an appreciation effect
due to the resolution of uncertainty: −8% = (0 − 0.21) · 0.3834. The net result is a
depreciation rate of ≃6.8%.
Table 6 presents another very interesting result. Unlike a large body of literature
that found negative coefficients on interest rate differentials in the UIP relationship,
we obtain the a-priori correct positive sign in our estimates for θ, although with high
standard errors. The point estimates are generally higher than one, but they are not
significantly different from 0. The model for the basket of currencies does not violate the
UIP, as the hypothesis θ = 1 cannot be rejected.
The DOLS estimates of q0 are 0.26 and 0.2 for ROWF and ROWT , respectively, with
large confidence intervals (at the 90%, the parameter lies between 0 and 0.6 approxi-
mately). The estimates are somewhat lower for FMOLS and OLS.14 Thus, as expected,
the effects of the odds variables are much higher after the Referendum Act, which con-
firms the intuition that only when market participants perceive that the Referendum will
take place for sure, they start placing more weight on the evolution of the odds.15 Also,
the coefficient δ on the variable q (non-interacted) is not significant, except for FMOLS
estimates for ROWT . This is consistent with the assumption that market participants
expected the same value for the exchange rate in the case of No Referendum and in the
case of a Remain victory. If the non-interacted q variable is omitted from the regression,
the estimates of q0 become larger and significant, but still remain below 0.5 (the DOLS
point estimates are around 0.44 for ROWF and 0.43 for ROWT ).
In our interpretation, the term α + δq gives the expected (log) exchange rate con-
ditional on a Remain vote. This implies that the multilateral (financially-weighted)
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 7 i 2 ‘  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i  U q = 1) should be approximately equal
to exp(α+ δq) = exp(−0.5046−0.0515) = 0.57, which is close but below the average rate
prevailing before the Referendum Act (see Figure 2).
Tables 8-10 report the DOLS estimates for each individual currency. Here we impose
the a priori restriction that q0 is the same for all countries, and equal to 0.25.16
The coefficient on the Leave probability qpi is positive and significant at the 1% level
for all currencies, with point estimates ranging from 0.17 to 0.30. The coefficient on
qpi(1 − pi) is also positive for all countries and significant at the 1% for all countries
except Japan (for which it is not significant), Norway (for which it is significant at the
10%) and New Zealand (for which it is significant at the 5%). The estimates for the
interest rate spread coefficient θ exhibit large cross-sectional variability. However, for
all countries except Japan and Sweden, the point estimate is positive. Due to the large
standard errors, the coefficient is not significantly different from 1 in the equations for
the Euro, the Swiss franc, the Swedish krone, the Australian dollar and the New Zealand
dollar. For the other currencies, the UIP is violated.
As shown in Tables 9 to 11, our main results remain valid when we extend the sample
by including one year of post-Referendum observations. In all equations, the estimates of
the Leave probability coefficient, β, are larger and those of the risk-premium coefficient,
γ, are lower than over the short sample, but in general the estimates are very similar.
Moreover, the estimates of the interest spread coefficient, θ, are now closer to the theo-
retical value of one both for the basket of currencies and for individual currencies, with
the exceptions of the Swiss franc and the Australian dollar. Notably, the UIP is now not
violated by the US dollar either.
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As a first check, we show that our Leave probability and risk-premium variables do not
simply capture a pre-post Referendum time effect.
We do this in two ways. First, we limit the sample to the pre-Referendum period
and estimate the model under risk neutrality (i.e., excluding the volatility variable) in
order to circumvent collinearity, and show that the Leave probability is indeed significant.
Second, we include in the model with risk neutrality a pre-post Referendum time dummy,
dvote, and estimate the equation using both pre- and post-Referendum observations.
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The results of the two regressions are reported in Table 12, in column 1 and 2 respec-
tively.
In both equations, the estimate for the Leave probability is positive, significantly
different from zero and larger than the benchmark estimate of β in Table 6. This result
is consistent with the fact that the risk-premium variable, which typically entered with
a positive sign, is now omitted in both equations.
The second equation, which exploits post-Referendum observations, shows that the
time dummy dvote enters with a negative and significant coefficient, which means an
appreciation of the BP in the aftermath after the vote. This is consistent with our
model, which implies that the resolution of uncertainty and the consequent drop of the
risk premium, now captured by the time dummy, should lead to an appreciation of the
BP.
5.4.2 Unrestricted Break Model
In our benchmark equation we have posited that a structural break occurs around the
promulgation of the EU Referendum Act. This section shows that this assumption is
supported by the data and that is largely inconsequential for the estimation results.
We estimate the basic model (11) by DOLS and perform the Quandt-Andrews test for
parameter instability at one unknown break date. We thus allow the data to determine
if and when the coefficients of pi and pi(1 − pi), i.e. β and γ, exhibit structural breaks.
We use a “pre”/“post” suffix to denote the parameter estimates for the pre/post - break
period.
Table 13 shows the results for the multilateral exchange rates ROWF and ROWT .
For both the trade- and the financially-weighted rates we strongly reject the hypothesis
that the coefficients do not change during the sample period. In both equations, we
estimate a break occurring on Jan. 7, 2016—only a few weeks after our prior of a break,
Dec. 17, 2015. Importantly, in the post-break sample the estimated coefficients of the
Leave probability and the risk-premium, βpost and γpost, are strongly significant and not
statistically different from our benchmark estimates for both exchange rates (see Table
6), while the coefficients are not significantly different from zero in the pre-break period.
Note, however, that this can be due to the fact that the covariates pi and pi(1 − pi) in
the pre-break sub-sample are highly collinear, and this may impair inference about their
individual coefficients.
An F -test rejects the null hypothesis that the Leave probability and the risk premium
are jointly non significant before the break in the case of ROWF , while the p-value is
12% approximately in the case of ROWT .
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The present and final section on robustness compares our model-based measure of political
risk premium with four standard measures of financial and economic uncertainty. In
particular, we show here that our measure based on the bookmakers’ Leave probability
is robust to their inclusion.
The first measure that we consider is the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index
for the UK developed by Baker et al. (2016). The index is constructed by counting
newspaper articles that contain at least one term from each of three sets of keywords: (i)
economic or economy; (ii) uncertain or uncertainty; (iii) policy-related words: spending,
deficit, regulation, budget, tax, policy, and Bank of England. The index covers the 650
U.K. newspapers included in the digital archives of the Access World News NewsBank
service. The data are provided at policyuncertainty.com.
The other three measures capture financial uncertainty and are derived from option
markets. The second measure is the UK counterpart of the VIX index, or VFTSE,
which is the option-implied 1-month-ahead volatility in the FTSE 100 equity index. It
represents the (risk-neutral) expected standard deviation of the stock market index. The
third measure is the risk-neutral expected volatility of the BP/USD exchange rate implied
by the prices of exchange-rate options with 3-month horizons. The fourth measure is the
so-called “risk reversal” of the BP. A risk reversal is the difference between the implied
volatility of out-of-the-money put options and the implied volatility of symmetric out-
of-the-money call options.17 This difference measures the premium paid for protection
against the expected skewness towards depreciation in the distribution of the investment
currency. A recent literature which focuses on disaster risk as a key determinant of the
exchange rate (e.g., Brunnermeier et al. (2008), Farhi and Gabaix (2015)) has underlined
a close relationship between the risk reversal and the level of the exchange rate. All
the three option-market variables actually capture a combination of uncertainty and risk
aversion (Bekaert et al. (2013) provide estimates of the two components in the case of
the VIX). The data source for all three series is Datastream.
Table 14 and 15 report the results of our robustness regression for the financially-
weighted multilateral exchange rate, using DOLS, over the short and long sample, re-
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spectively. In both tables, columns 1-4 show the results obtained when the additional
regressors are included one at a time, while in column 5 all four measures are included
simultaneously. The two tables show that the coefficients of our measures of the Leave
probability and of the risk premium, qpi and qpi(1− pi) respectively, remain highly signif-
icant irrespective of the inclusion of the other volatility indicators. All the uncertainty
indicators, with the exception of the VFTSE, when included one by one are significant
and have the expected positive sign, implying that more uncertainty is associated to a
weaker BP. Only when all uncertainty and risk premium measures are included at the
same time our risk-premium measure qpi(1− pi) becomes not significant in both samples,
whereas qpi remains highly significant over the long sample. Interestingly, when the risk
reversal measure is included in the equation, the point estimate of the UIP coefficient of
the interest differential is very close to the theoretical value of one over the short sample.
5.5 System Estimation
The predominant part of the empirical literature on exchange rates focuses on the esti-
mation of single-equation models for bilateral exchange rates.
Our portfolio approach suggests that efficiency gains can be obtained by exploiting the
information contained in the co-movement of exchange rates. In fact the model implies
that as long as investors choose the asset/currency composition of their portfolios by
considering interest yields and the covariance structure of currencies, their risk-attitude
should be the same across all currencies. This implies that all bilateral BP exchange
rates should be equally affected by a change in the political risk-premium associated to
Brexit. In this section we estimate a system of equations (15) simultaneously and test
the cross-equation restriction that the coefficient of the volatility term qpi(1 − pi), i.e.
the parameter γ, should be the same for all currencies. As it happens with Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) and OLS estimators, the DOLS system and single-equation
estimators coincide when cross-currency error terms are not correlated, while the system
estimator, the Dynamic SUR (DSUR) (see Mark et al. (2005)), is more efficient than
DOLS when the cross-currency errors are correlated. Like the static SUR, the DSUR is a
two-step estimator: in the first step, the system is estimated by dynamic OLS in order to
obtain a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the errors; in the second step, all
the other model parameters are estimated by (dynamic) generalized least squares (GLS),
taking the covariance matrix from in step 1 as given. To account for autocorrelation,
the DSUR approach considers the long-run covariance matrix of the error terms. As we
consider a system of equations, we want to make sure that investors’ prior expectations
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exchange rate under consideration.
Imposing the cross-equation equality restriction on q0 introduces another non-linear
constraint into the system. To address this issue we proceed as follows. In the first step of
our DSUR estimation procedure, we run a nonlinear DOLS and estimate q0, as well as the
long-run covariance matrix of residuals,18 imposing that q0 is the same in all equations.
In the second step, we use the estimate for q0 from step 1 to construct the regressors qpi
and qpi(1− pi) and estimate the other parameters by GLS.
Next, we test the theoretical prediction that the risk premium should enter all equa-
tions with the same coefficient, i.e. γj = γ for every currency j. We exploit the fact that
Wald test statistics obtained using the DOLS and DSUR estimators are asymptotically
chi-square under the null hypothesis (Stock and Watson (1993), Mark et al. (2005)) that
the parameter γ is the same across exchange rates. For both the DOLS and DSUR es-
timates, the Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis at any conventional significance
level. Finally, we re-estimate the DSUR system imposing this restriction on γ. Tables
16-19 present the results.
The estimates of β, γ and q0 are in line with the results obtained so far and thus
corroborate our findings. Moreover, for all countries except Norway, Australia and New
Zealand, the point estimates of θ are now closer to the UIP-implied value of 1, both in
the short and in the long sample.
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In this paper we analyze the role that political uncertainty plays in currency markets.
We choose not to follow the prevalent literature which typically starts off by building
indexes based either on financial volatility measures or on the frequency of political news
featuring particular keywords. Instead, we choose a very specific political event, Brexit,
relative to which we can define and measure the probability distribution of the event
under scrutiny. We do so by exploiting data from bookmakers odds.
Provided we are willing to accept that the most relevant source of political uncertainty
during the period of analysis is the Brexit Referendum outcome, our approach allows
us to pin down the conditional exchange rate expectations and to exploit the event’s
binary nature, Leave or Remain, for deriving the “correct” measure the uncertainty, the
second moment of distribution. This measure provides us with the theoretically “correct”
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definition of risk premium associated to currency markets.
Our simple model of portfolio choice predicts that a rise in the Leave probability
should (likely) be associated to a depreciation of the British Pound relative to other
currencies, and that overshooting should occur as investors move away from a “riskier”
BP due to the volatility effect.
Our simple framework makes explicit that the resolution of uncertainty concerning
Brexit should be reflected in structural breaks in the parameters, since the latter reflect
market expectations in a predictable way. Also, the model is easily generalized to the
case of multiple currencies as investors choose the currency composition of their portfolio,
so that a cross-equation restriction should hold across the exchange rates.
We test these implications on daily data for the major bilateral exchange rates and for
multilateral exchange rates, for different time periods, using different single and multiple
equation estimators, and allowing for “theory” as well as “data” based structural breaks.
We find a strong statistical support for the model’s implications, with results that shed
some light on the long-standing Uncovered Interest Parity anomaly that has puzzled
analysts for about three decades.
In particular, we find that the bookmakers’ Leave probability is associated to a British
Pound depreciation, suggesting that investors expected the British Pound to weaken by
the order of 15-20 percent in the case of a Leave victory relative to the case of Remain.
Moreover, our measure of political risk premium is significantly associated to a strong
BP depreciation. More specifically, we find that the surprise victory of the Leave camp
in the Referendum is associated to a depreciation of the BP exchange rate by 15%, while
the resolution of uncertainty appreciates it by 8%, with a net result of a 7% depreciation,
approximately.
Finally, when we estimate a system of exchange rate equations, we cannot reject the
model implication that all bilateral exchange rates are equally affected by political risk,
and we find that the Uncovered Interest Parity condition cannot be rejected either.
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CAN -2.2905 0.1758 -1.3548 0.6051
DAN -2.6713 0.0803 -2.6722 0.0795
SWE -2.2909 0.1757 -3.1354 0.0246
NOR -3.1094 0.0270 -2.6175 0.0900
AUS -2.6572 0.0829 -3.8028 0.0031
NZL -2.8236 0.0562 -3.2074 0.0201
 L Q i 2 b , e  ,  H Q ;  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 - i∗−i  ,  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V  B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i
 ‘  i 2 b X  l M / 2 ‘  i ? 2  M m H H  ? v T Q i ? 2 b B b -  i ? 2  b 2 ‘ B 2 b  ? 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 + E B M M Q M  U R N N e V  T @ p  H m 2 b   ‘ 2
 ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i 2 / X  h ? 2  /  i    ‘ 2  /  B H v X  a ? Q ‘ i  b  K T H 2 ,  k d  J  v  k y R 8  i Q  j y  C m M 2  k y R e X  G Q M ;  b  K T H 2 ,  k d
 J  v  k y R 8  i Q  k j  C m M 2  k y R d X  h ? 2  H  ;  Q ‘ / 2 ‘  m b 2 /  7 Q ‘   H H  i 2 b i b  B b  8 X
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 h  # H 2  j ,   m ; K 2 M i 2 /  . B + F 2 v @ 6 m H H 2 ‘  i 2 b i ,pi and qpi
variable t-stat. p-value
pi -3.7481 0.0039
qpi (q = 0.25 before Ref. Act) -1.1760 0.6854
qpi (q = 0.5 before Ref. Act) -1.3929 0.5863
 L Q i 2 b , pi  B b  Q m ‘  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v  p 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 # H 2 -  +  H + m H  i 2 /   b  i ? 2   p 2 ‘  ; 2  Q 7  i ? 2  " 2 i 7  B ‘   M /  S ‘ 2 / B + i A i
 Q / / b @ / 2 ‘ B p 2 /  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i B 2 b -q  / 2 M Q i 2 b  i ? 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H /  U  7 i 2 ‘  i ? 2
 1 l  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i -  B i  B b  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 F 2  p  H m 2  R V X  h ? 2  b  K T H 2  m b 2 /  7 Q ‘  i ? 2  i 2 b i b  B b ,  8 f k d f k y R 8
 @  e f k k f k y R e X  l M / 2 ‘  i ? 2  M m H H  ? v T Q i ? 2 b B b -  i ? 2  b 2 ‘ B 2 b  ?  b    m M B i  ‘ Q Q i X  J  + E B M M Q M  U R N N e V  T @ p  H m 2 b
  ‘ 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i 2 / X  h ? 2  /  i    ‘ 2  /  B H v X  h ? 2  H  ;  Q ‘ / 2 ‘  m b 2 /  7 Q ‘   H H  i 2 b i b  B b  8 X
Table 4: Phillips-Ouliaris test of cointegration between e, i∗ − i, qpi and qpi(1− pi),
with q = 0.25 before the Referendum Act
short sample long sample
currency tau-stat. p-value tau-stat. p-value
ROWF -4.2152 0.0408 -4.3286 0.0284
ROWT -3.8752 0.0925 -4.4056 0.0228
EUR -3.7424 0.1230 -4.4336 0.0210
USA -5.6049 0.0004 -3.7631 0.1146
JAP -3.5305 0.1858 -3.9798 0.0702
CHE -3.2195 0.3103 -4.1857 0.0418
CAN -4.3852 0.0259 -3.9736 0.0712
DAN -4.1354 0.0500 -4.6831 0.0098
SWE -3.3361 0.2593 -4.3752 0.0249
NOR -2.7482 0.5496 -3.4241 0.2209
AUS -2.6069 0.6230 -3.4449 0.2130
NZL -3.7467 0.1219 -4.3929 0.0237
 L Q i 2 b , e  ,  H Q ;  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 - i∗ − i ,  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V
 B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2 b - pi  ,  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v -q  ,  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H / X  l M / 2 ‘  i ? 2
 M m H H  ? v T Q i ? 2 b B b -  i ? 2  b 2 ‘ B 2 b   ‘ 2  M Q i  + Q B M i 2 ; ‘  i 2 / X  J  + E B M M Q M  U R N N e V  T @ p  H m 2 b   ‘ 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i 2 / Xq
 i  F 2 b  p  H m 2  R   7 i 2 ‘  i ? 2  1 l  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i X  h ? 2  /  i    ‘ 2  /  B H v X  a ? Q ‘ i  b  K T H 2  4  k d  J  v  k y R 8
 i Q  j y  C m M 2  k y R e X  G Q M ;  b 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 h  # H 2  8 ,  S ? B H H B T b @ P m H B  ‘ B b  i 2 b i  Q 7  + Q B M i 2 ; ‘  i B Q M  #  2 i r 2 2 Me, i∗ − i, qpi and qpi(1− pi),
with q = 0.5 before the Referendum Act
short sample long sample
currency tau-stat. p-value tau-stat. p-value
ROWF -4.9726 0.0042 -4.6956 0.0094
ROWT -4.5156 0.0178 -4.8030 0.0066
EUR -4.2771 0.0347 -4.8395 0.0059
USA -6.3029 0.0000 -3.9410 0.0770
JAP -3.8334 0.1014 -4.2047 0.0398
CHE -3.3888 0.2379 -4.3137 0.0296
CAN -4.4966 0.0188 -4.0436 0.0601
DAN -4.7571 0.0085 -5.1286 0.0021
SWE -3.9255 0.0826 -4.8553 0.0055
NOR -2.7934 0.5258 -3.4523 0.2102
AUS -2.6764 0.5873 -3.4938 0.1952
NZL -4.0057 0.0686 -4.4940 0.0176
 L Q i 2 b , e  ,  H Q ;  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 - i∗ − i ,  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V
 B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2 b - pi  ,  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v -q  ,  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H / X  l M / 2 ‘  i ? 2
 M m H H  ? v T Q i ? 2 b B b -  i ? 2  b 2 ‘ B 2 b   ‘ 2  M Q i  + Q B M i 2 ; ‘  i 2 / X  J  + E B M M Q M  U R N N e V  T @ p  H m 2 b Xq  i  F 2 b  p  H m 2  R
  7 i 2 ‘  i ? 2  1 l  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i X  h ? 2  /  i    ‘ 2  /  B H v X  a ? Q ‘ i  b  K T H 2  4  k d  J  v  k y R 8  i Q  j y  C m M 2
 k y R e X  G Q M ;  b  K T H 2  4  k d  J  v  k y R 8  i Q  k j  C m M 2  k y R d X
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 h  # H 2  e ,  . P G a -  6 J P G a   M /  P G a  2 b i B K  i 2 b  7 Q ‘  i ? 2  " S  2 z 2 + i B p 2  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 b -
 b ? Q ‘ i  b  K T H 2  U 8 f k d f k y R 8 @ e f j y f k y R e V
 . P G a  6 J P G a  P G a
 _ P q F  _ P q T  _ P q F  _ P q T  _ P q F  _ P q T
i∗ − i  k X k j 8 d  k X N R k N  R X d e y e  k X e 8 3 d  y X e k y 3  R X R 9 N d
 U k X d y e e V  U k X 8 y j e V  U k X k N j j V  U k X 9 y 3 k V  U R X 9 y R 3 V  U R X e y j d V
qpi  y X k R R k       y X k k k k       y X k y d d       y X k k R 8       y X R 3 8 R       y X R N 8 R      
 U y X y j k N V  U y X y j 3 8 V  U y X y j 9 9 V  U y X y 9 R k V  U y X y k N d V  U y X y j 9 3 V
qpi(1− pi)  y X j 3 j 9       y X 9 R N 3       y X j e d 3       y X 9 R d       y X k 3 R 9       y X j k      
 U y X R y y j V  U y X R R 3 N V  U y X R R k N V  U y X R j j d V  U y X y N y 3 V  U y X R y e e V
const  @ y X 8 y 9 e       @ y X 9 8 y 9       @ y X 8 y j e       @ y X 9 9 9 R       @ y X 8 y N d       @ y X 9 8 8 k      
 U y X y k k e V  U y X y k j 9 V  U y X y R k k V  U y X y R 8 3 V  U y X y k j d V  U y X y k k V
q  @ y X y 8 R 8  @ y X y e 8 j  @ y X y 8 R 9  @ y X y d j 8   @ y X y k e 8  @ y X y 9 8 9
 U y X y j 3 d V  U y X y 9 j 9 V  U y X y j j 9 V  U y X y j N j V  U y X y 9 k k V  U y X y 9 j R V
q0  y X k 8 e 9  y X R N d 3  y X k j y e  y X R R N 9  y X k j R 9  y X R j 9 8
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 T 2 ‘  U _ P qF  ,  } M  M + B 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 M /   7 i 2 ‘
 i ? 2  T ‘ Q K m H ;  i B Q M  Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i -  ‘ 2 b T 2 + i B p 2 H v Xθ  B b  i ? 2  + Q 2 { + B 2 M i  Q 7  i ? 2  B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2
 / B z 2 ‘ 2 M i B  Hi∗ − i - α  B b  i ? 2  + Q M b i  M i X  h ? 2  # Q i i Q K  T  ‘ i  Q 7  i ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  i ? 2  2 b i B K  i 2 /  # ‘ 2  F
 /  i 2   M /  i ? 2  T @ p  H m 2  Q 7   F  @ i 2 b i  Q 7  D Q B M i  M Q M @ b B ; M B } +  M + 2  Q 7βpre   M / γpre  X  h ? 2  b  K T H 2  ; Q 2 b
 7 ‘ Q K  k d  J  v  k y R 8  i Q  j y  C m M 2  k y R e X  a B ; M B } +  M + 2  H 2 p 2 H b ,        R W -      8 W -    R y W X
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 h  # H 2  R 9 ,  _ Q # m b i M 2 b b ,  Q i ? 2 ‘  m M + 2 ‘ i  B M i v  K 2  b m ‘ 2 b -  b ? Q ‘ i  b  K T H 2  U 8 f k d f k y R 8 @ e f j y f k y R e V
 U R V  U k V  U j V  U 9 V  U 8 V
i∗ − i  k X N 9 k R  k X y N 3 j  y X e 9 8 k  R X y 8 3 R  y X N j y j
 U k X d j k k V  U k X 8 R N e V  U k X d d R N V  U k X 3 y 8 8 V  U k X 3 R k k V
qpi  y X R 9 k j       y X k y 9 e       y X R 8 N 8       y X R N 9 8       y X y 8 9 d
 U y X y j 9 N V  U y X y j 9 V  U y X y R d j V  U y X y k y e V  U y X y j d 3 V
qpi(1− pi)  y X 9 d k 9       y X j d N N       y X k k N 3       y X k N d k       y X y j j N
 U y X R y d d V  U y X R y d e V  U y X y e 3 R V  U y X y d y R V  U y X y N j N V
 + Q M b i  @ y X 8 y d k       @ y X 8 R k 3       @ y X 8 j j d       @ y X 8 y N d       @ y X e y y 3      
 U y X y R 8 R V  U y X y R 8 3 V  U y X y R 3 9 V  U y X y R 8 8 V  U y X y k k e V
q  @ y X y 8 d j   @ y X y 8 R k  @ y X y k 9 N  @ y X y 9 R k   y X y j k 9
 U y X y j y R V  U y X y j 9 N V  U y X y k y R V  U y X y k j k V  U y X y k 9 N V




volfx  y X y y j 9       y X y R k 8      
 U y X y y y N V  U y X y y k 3 V
riskrev  y X y y j N       @ y X y R j N      
 U y X y y R 8 V  U y X y y 9 8 V
q0  y X k 8  y X k 8  y X k 8  y X k 8  y X k 8
 L Q i 2 b ,  h ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  . P G a  2 b i B K  i 2 b  U  M /  >  *  b i  M /  ‘ /  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘ b  B M  T  ‘ 2 M i ? 2 b 2 b V X  h ? 2
 / 2 T 2 M / 2 M i  p  ‘ B  # H 2  B b  i ? 2  H Q ;  } M  M + B  H H v @ r 2 B ; ? i 2 /  2 z 2 + i B p 2  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 b  Q 7  i ? 2  " ‘ B i B b ?  T Q m M /
  ;  B M b i  i ? 2  #  b F 2 i  Q 7  i 2 M  + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b  + Q M b B / 2 ‘ 2 /  B M  i ? 2  T  T 2 ‘ Xi∗ − i  B b  i ? 2  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M
 i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V  B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2 b -pi  B b  i ? 2  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v -q  B b  i ? 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v
 Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H / Xq  i  F 2 b  p  H m 2 q0  # 2 7 Q ‘ 2  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i   M /  R   7 i 2 ‘ r  ‘ / b X
 h ? 2  # Q i i Q K  T  ‘ i  Q 7  i ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  i ? 2  + Q M b i ‘  B M 2 /  p  H m 2  Q 7q0  Xepuuk  B b  i ? 2  1 + Q M Q K B +  S Q H B + v
 l M + 2 ‘ i  B M i v  B M / 2 t  U "  F 2 ‘  2 i   H X -  k y R e V  7 Q ‘  i ? 2  l E -  / B p B / 2 /  # v  R y y -vftse  B b  i ? 2  o 6 h a 1  B M / 2 t -
 B X 2 X  i ? 2  Q T i B Q M @ B K T H B 2 /  R @ K Q M i ? @  ? 2  /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  6 a h 1  R y y  b i Q + F  K  ‘ F 2 i  B M / 2 t -volfx    b
 i ? 2  B M / 2 t  Q 7  Q T i B Q M @ B K T H B 2 /  j @ K Q M i ? @  ? 2  /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  " S f l a .  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 -riskrev  B b
 i ? 2  ‘ B b F  ‘ 2 p 2 ‘ b  H  Q 7  i ? 2  " S -  B X 2 X  i ? 2  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  B K T H B 2 /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  Q m i @ Q 7 @ i ? 2 @ K Q M 2 v
 T m i  Q T i B Q M b   M /  i ? 2  B K T H B 2 /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  b v K K 2 i ‘ B +  Q m i @ Q 7 @ i ? 2 @ K Q M 2 v  +  H H  Q T i B Q M b X  a B ; M B } +  M + 2
 H 2 p 2 H b ,        R W -      8 W -    R y W X
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 h  # H 2  R 8 ,  _ Q # m b i M 2 b b ,  Q i ? 2 ‘  m M + 2 ‘ i  B M i v  K 2  b m ‘ 2 b -  H Q M ;  b  K T H 2  U 8 f k d f k y R 8 @ e f k j f k y R d V
 U R V  U k V  U j V  U 9 V  U 8 V
i∗ − i  y X 8 N j 8  R X j y d 9  k X 3 3 N k  R X e d N 8  k X j R y N
 U k X R N y N V  U k X R j d e V  U R X N 8 8 k V  U k X y j 9 8 V  U R X N e V
qpi  y X k 8 R j       y X k 9 d 3       y X k y j R       y X k k R 9       y X k R R j      
 U y X y j 9 R V  U y X y j j 3 V  U y X y k y 8 V  U y X y k y 9 V  U y X y j R V
qpi(1− pi)  y X k 3 9 j       y X k 3 3 j       y X R j N k   y X R e d j     y X y 3 k 3
 U y X R y 3 V  U y X R y 3 R V  U y X y 3 y j V  U y X y e N k V  U y X y 3 N k V
 + Q M b i  @ y X 8 R R       @ y X 8 R y N       @ y X 8 R 3 k       @ y X 8 y e 9       @ y X 8 k e j      
 U y X y R R d V  U y X y R j 3 V  U y X y R j R V  U y X y R R k V  U y X y R d k V
q  @ y X y 9 j k  @ y X y 9 9 j  @ y X y R 8 j  @ y X y k 8 j  @ y X y R R k
 U y X y j 9 3 V  U y X y j 9 9 V  U y X y k k R V  U y X y k R d V  U y X y k d R V




volfx  y X y y k 3       y X y y k k
 U y X y y R V  U y X y y k d V
riskrev  y X y y 9 N       y X y y j 8
 U y X y y R 8 V  U y X y y 9 N V
q0  y X k 8  y X k 8  y X k 8  y X k 8  y X k 8
 L Q i 2 b ,  h ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  . P G a  2 b i B K  i 2 b  U  M /  >  *  b i  M /  ‘ /  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘ b  B M  T  ‘ 2 M i ? 2 b 2 b V X  h ? 2
 / 2 T 2 M / 2 M i  p  ‘ B  # H 2  B b  i ? 2  H Q ;  } M  M + B  H H v @ r 2 B ; ? i 2 /  2 z 2 + i B p 2  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 b  Q 7  i ? 2  " ‘ B i B b ?  T Q m M /
  ;  B M b i  i ? 2  #  b F 2 i  Q 7  i 2 M  + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b  + Q M b B / 2 ‘ 2 /  B M  i ? 2  T  T 2 ‘ Xi∗ − i  B b  i ? 2  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M
 i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V  B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2 b -pi  B b  i ? 2  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v -q  B b  i ? 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v
 Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H / Xq  i  F 2 b  p  H m 2 q0  # 2 7 Q ‘ 2  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i   M /  R   7 i 2 ‘ r  ‘ / b X
 h ? 2  # Q i i Q K  T  ‘ i  Q 7  i ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  i ? 2  + Q M b i ‘  B M 2 /  p  H m 2  Q 7q0  Xepuuk  B b  i ? 2  1 + Q M Q K B +  S Q H B + v
 l M + 2 ‘ i  B M i v  B M / 2 t  U "  F 2 ‘  2 i   H X -  k y R e V  7 Q ‘  i ? 2  l E -  / B p B / 2 /  # v  R y y -vftse  B b  i ? 2  o 6 h a 1  B M / 2 t -
 B X 2 X  i ? 2  Q T i B Q M @ B K T H B 2 /  R @ K Q M i ? @  ? 2  /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  6 a h 1  R y y  b i Q + F  K  ‘ F 2 i  B M / 2 t -volfx    b
 i ? 2  B M / 2 t  Q 7  Q T i B Q M @ B K T H B 2 /  j @ K Q M i ? @  ? 2  /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  " S f l a .  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 -riskrev  B b
 i ? 2  ‘ B b F  ‘ 2 p 2 ‘ b  H  Q 7  i ? 2  " S -  B X 2 X  i ? 2  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  B K T H B 2 /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  Q m i @ Q 7 @ i ? 2 @ K Q M 2 v
 T m i  Q T i B Q M b   M /  i ? 2  B K T H B 2 /  p Q H  i B H B i v  Q 7  b v K K 2 i ‘ B +  Q m i @ Q 7 @ i ? 2 @ K Q M 2 v  +  H H  Q T i B Q M b X  a B ; M B } +  M + 2
 H 2 p 2 H b ,        R W -      8 W -    R y W X
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 h  # H 2  R e ,  . v M  K B +  a l _  U . a l _ V  2 b i B K  i 2 b  r B i ?  + ‘ Q b b @ 2 [ m  i B Q M  ‘ 2 b i ‘ B + i B Q M  Q Mγ,
short sample (5/27/2015-6/30/2016)
 1 l _  l a   C  S  * > 1  *  L
i∗ − i  k X d R k 9       j X j 3 9 9     @ 3 X k 3 R N       R X k 3 3 k  R k X N e 9 8      
 U y X d R e e V  U R X 9 j e d V  U R X d k y 8 V  U R X R d e k V  U R X R d j 8 V
qpi  y X k R k       y X R N 9 9       y X j 9 8 3       y X k j 9 3       y X k R k      
 U y X y j 3 V  U y X y k d 8 V  U y X y 8 d V  U y X y j 3 d V  U y X y 9 d 8 V
qpi(1− pi)  y X j d d j       y X j d d j       y X j d d j       y X j d d j       y X j d d j      
 U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V
const  @ y X j j e e       @ y X 9 9 9 9       @ 8 X j 9 d e       @ y X j N 3 d       @ y X d R e      
 U y X y y d k V  U y X y y 8 8 V  U y X y R 9 k V  U y X y R N R V  U y X y y e 8 V
q  @ y X y j e e  @ y X y 8 N j     @ y X y y e j  @ y X y 3 R k       @ y X y d d N      
 U y X y k 8 R V  U y X y k j R V  U y X y j y 9 V  U y X y k 8 k V  U y X y k d 9 V
q0  y X k d k e  y X k d k e  y X k d k e  y X k d k e  y X k d k e
 L Q i 2 b ,  h ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  . a l _  2 b i B K  i 2 b  U  M /  b i  M /  ‘ /  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘ b  B M  T  ‘ 2 M i ? 2 b 2 b V  7 Q ‘  i ? 2  # B H  i 2 ‘  H
 H Q ;  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 b  Q 7  i ? 2  " ‘ B i B b ?  T Q m M /   ;  B M b i  i ? 2  1 m ‘ Q  U 1 l _ V -  i ? 2  l a  / Q H H  ‘  U l a  V -  i ? 2
 C  T  M 2 b 2  v 2 M  U C  S V -  i ? 2  a r B b b  7 ‘  M +  U * > 1 V   M /  i ? 2  *  M  / B  M  / Q H H  ‘  U *  L V X i∗ − i  B b  i ? 2
 / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V  B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2 b -pi  B b  i ? 2  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v -
q  B b  i ? 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H / Xq  i  F 2 b  p  H m 2 q0  # 2 7 Q ‘ 2  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i
  M /  R   7 i 2 ‘ r  ‘ / b X  h ? 2  # Q i i Q K  T  ‘ i  Q 7  i ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  i ? 2  2 b i B K  i 2  Q 7 q0  X  h ? 2  p  H m 2  Q 7q0
  M /  i ? 2  H Q M ; @ ‘ m M  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘  + Q p  ‘ B  M + 2  K  i ‘ B t   ‘ 2  2 b i B K  i 2 /  B M  i ? 2  } ‘ b i  b i 2 T  # v  . P G a -  B K T Q b B M ;  i ? 2
 2 [ m  H B i v  Q 7q0   + ‘ Q b b  + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b X  h ? 2  H Q M ; @ ‘ m M  + Q p  ‘ B  M + 2  K  i ‘ B t  B b  2 b i B K  i 2 /  m b B M ;    "  ‘ i H 2 i i
 F 2 ‘ M 2 H  r B i ?  L 2 r 2 v @ q 2 b i  } t 2 /  #  M / r B / i ?  Q 7  e X  A M  i ? 2  b 2 + Q M /  b i 2 T  U 2 b i B K  i 2 /  # v  : G a V -  i ? 2
 + Q 2 { + B 2 M i  Q 7qpi(1 − pi) -  B X 2 Xγ  -  B b  + Q M b i ‘  B M 2 /  i Q  # 2  i ? 2  b  K 2   + ‘ Q b b  + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b X  a B ; M B } +  M + 2
 H 2 p 2 H b ,        R W -      8 W -    R y W X
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 h  # H 2  R d ,  . v M  K B +  a l _  U . a l _ V  2 b i B K  i 2 b  r B i ?  + ‘ Q b b @ 2 [ m  i B Q M  ‘ 2 b i ‘ B + i B Q M  Q Mγ,
short sample (5/27/2015-6/30/2016)
 .  L  a q 1  L P _   l a  L w G
i∗ − i  j X R e N k       R X k N d 3  R y X j e R j       8 X 8 8 j 8       9 X 9 e y 8      
 U y X 9 e y 3 V  U R X R e e R V  U R X k y 3 k V  U R X j k y 9 V  U R X y N e 3 V
qpi  y X k R 8 j       y X k y y 9       y X k y N R       y X k 8 R       y X k N R e      
 U y X y j e e V  U y X y 9 y R V  U y X y 8 k 9 V  U y X y 8 8 j V  U y X y 8 y 8 V
qpi(1− pi)  y X j d d j       y X j d d j       y X j d d j       y X j d d j       y X j d d j      
 U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V  U y X y d 8 R V
const  @ k X j j y j       @ k X 8 3 j       @ k X e R k N       @ y X 3 e N R       @ y X N N 9 3      
 U y X y y d R V  U y X y R k N V  U y X y y N 3 V  U y X y k 9 e V  U y X y j y N V
q  @ y X y 9 8 k   @ y X y k e 3  @ y X y 8 N N     @ y X y 8 k   @ y X y R 3 R
 U y X y k 9 d V  U y X y k 8 8 V  U y X y k 3 N V  U y X y k N 8 V  U y X y k N V
q0  y X k d k e  y X k d k e  y X k d k e  y X k d k e  y X k d k e
 L Q i 2 b ,  h ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  . a l _  2 b i B K  i 2 b  U  M /  b i  M /  ‘ /  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘ b  B M  T  ‘ 2 M i ? 2 b 2 b V  7 Q ‘  i ? 2  # B H  i 2 ‘  H
 H Q ;  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 b  Q 7  i ? 2  " ‘ B i B b ?  T Q m M /   ;  B M b i  i ? 2  .  M B b ?  F ‘ Q M 2  U .  L V -  i ? 2  a r 2 / B b ?  F ‘ Q M 2
 U a q 1 V -  i ? 2  L Q ‘ r 2 ; B  M  F ‘ Q M 2  U L P _ V -  i ? 2   m b i ‘  H B  M  / Q H H  ‘  U  l a V   M /  i ? 2  L 2 r  w 2  H  M /  / Q H H  ‘
 U L w G V Xi∗ − i  B b  i ? 2  / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V  B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2 b -pi  B b
 i ? 2  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v -q  B b  i ? 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H / Xq  i  F 2 b  p  H m 2 q0  # 2 7 Q ‘ 2
 i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i   M /  R   7 i 2 ‘ r  ‘ / b X  h ? 2  # Q i i Q K  T  ‘ i  Q 7  i ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  i ? 2  2 b i B K  i 2  Q 7
q0  X  h ? 2  p  H m 2  Q 7q0   M /  i ? 2  H Q M ; @ ‘ m M  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘  + Q p  ‘ B  M + 2  K  i ‘ B t   ‘ 2  2 b i B K  i 2 /  B M  i ? 2  } ‘ b i  b i 2 T
 # v  . P G a -  B K T Q b B M ;  i ? 2  2 [ m  H B i v  Q 7q0   + ‘ Q b b  + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b X  h ? 2  H Q M ; @ ‘ m M  + Q p  ‘ B  M + 2  K  i ‘ B t  B b
 2 b i B K  i 2 /  m b B M ;    "  ‘ i H 2 i i  F 2 ‘ M 2 H  r B i ?  L 2 r 2 v @ q 2 b i  } t 2 /  #  M / r B / i ?  Q 7  e X  A M  i ? 2  b 2 + Q M /  b i 2 T
 U 2 b i B K  i 2 /  # v  : G a V -  i ? 2  + Q 2 { + B 2 M i  Q 7qpi(1 − pi)  -  B X 2 Xγ  -  B b  + Q M b i ‘  B M 2 /  i Q  # 2  i ? 2  b  K 2   + ‘ Q b b
 + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b X  a B ; M B } +  M + 2  H 2 p 2 H b ,        R W -      8 W -    R y W X
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 h  # H 2  R 3 ,  . v M  K B +  a l _  U . a l _ V  2 b i B K  i 2 b  r B i ?  + ‘ Q b b @ 2 [ m  i B Q M  ‘ 2 b i ‘ B + i B Q M  Q Mγ,
long sample (5/27/2015-6/23/2017)
 1 l _  l a   C  S  * > 1  *  L
i∗ − i  k X y j j d       R X 8 9 3 k  @ 3 X k R d 3       R X 3 8 3 k     3 X 9 8 9 8      
 U y X 8 9 3 j V  U y X N N 3 R V  U R X e R j R V  U y X d 9 N R V  U R X k e 8 8 V
qpi  y X k e d d       y X k N 9 R       y X j 3 3 j       y X k 3 d k       y X k 8 8 8      
 U y X y j j k V  U y X y j 9 R V  U y X y j 8 9 V  U y X y j j k V  U y X y j 8 R V
qpi(1− pi)  y X 9 y 3 N       y X 9 y 3 N       y X 9 y 3 N       y X 9 y 3 N       y X 9 y 3 N      
 U y X R y 3 V  U y X R y 3 V  U y X R y 3 V  U y X R y 3 V  U y X R y 3 V
const  @ y X j 9 j N       @ y X 9 8 k       @ 8 X j 8 R 9       @ y X j N R k       @ y X d R 8 8      
 U y X y y e d V  U y X y y e N V  U y X y R 9 e V  U y X y R j V U y X y y d e V
q  @ y X y 8 N 3   @ y X y 3 3 8       @ y X y k R 8  @ y X R y j       @ y X y N N d      
 U y X y j 9 V  U y X y j 9 j V  U y X y j d k V  U y X y j 9 V  U y X y j 8 j V
q0  y X k N y 3  y X k N y 3  y X k N y 3  y X k N y 3  y X k N y 3
 L Q i 2 b ,  h ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  . a l _  2 b i B K  i 2 b  U  M /  b i  M /  ‘ /  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘ b  B M  T  ‘ 2 M i ? 2 b 2 b V  7 Q ‘  i ? 2  # B H  i 2 ‘  H
 H Q ;  2 t + ?  M ; 2  ‘  i 2 b  Q 7  i ? 2  " ‘ B i B b ?  T Q m M /   ;  B M b i  i ? 2  1 m ‘ Q  U 1 l _ V -  i ? 2  l a  / Q H H  ‘  U l a  V -  i ? 2
 C  T  M 2 b 2  v 2 M  U C  S V -  i ? 2  a r B b b  7 ‘  M +  U * > 1 V   M /  i ? 2  *  M  / B  M  / Q H H  ‘  U *  L V X i∗ − i  B b  i ? 2
 / B z 2 ‘ 2 M + 2  # 2 i r 2 2 M  i ? 2  7 Q ‘ 2 B ; M   M /  i ? 2  / Q K 2 b i B +  U l E V  B M i 2 ‘ 2 b i  ‘  i 2 b -pi  B b  i ? 2  G 2  p 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v -
q  B b  i ? 2  T ‘ Q #  # B H B i v  Q 7  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K  # 2 B M ;  ? 2 H / Xq  i  F 2 b  p  H m 2 q0  # 2 7 Q ‘ 2  i ? 2  _ 2 7 2 ‘ 2 M / m K   + i
  M /  R   7 i 2 ‘ r  ‘ / b X  h ? 2  # Q i i Q K  T  ‘ i  Q 7  i ? 2  i  # H 2  ‘ 2 T Q ‘ i b  i ? 2  2 b i B K  i 2  Q 7 q0  X  h ? 2  p  H m 2  Q 7q0
  M /  i ? 2  H Q M ; @ ‘ m M  2 ‘ ‘ Q ‘  + Q p  ‘ B  M + 2  K  i ‘ B t   ‘ 2  2 b i B K  i 2 /  B M  i ? 2  } ‘ b i  b i 2 T  # v  . P G a -  B K T Q b B M ;  i ? 2
 2 [ m  H B i v  Q 7q0   + ‘ Q b b  + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b X  h ? 2  H Q M ; @ ‘ m M  + Q p  ‘ B  M + 2  K  i ‘ B t  B b  2 b i B K  i 2 /  m b B M ;    "  ‘ i H 2 i i
 F 2 ‘ M 2 H  r B i ?  L 2 r 2 v @ q 2 b i  } t 2 /  #  M / r B / i ?  Q 7  e X  A M  i ? 2  b 2 + Q M /  b i 2 T  U 2 b i B K  i 2 /  # v  : G a V -  i ? 2
 + Q 2 { + B 2 M i  Q 7qpi(1 − pi) -  B X 2 Xγ  -  B b  + Q M b i ‘  B M 2 /  i Q  # 2  i ? 2  b  K 2   + ‘ Q b b  + m ‘ ‘ 2 M + B 2 b X  a B ; M B } +  M + 2
 H 2 p 2 H b ,        R W -      8 W -    R y W X
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 h  # H 2  R N ,  . v M  K B +  a l _  U . a l _ V  2 b i B K  i 2 b  r B i ?  + ‘ Q b b @ 2 [ m  i B Q M  ‘ 2 b i ‘ B + i B Q M  Q Mγ,
long sample (5/27/2015-6/23/2017)
 .  L  a q 1  L P _   l a  L w G
i∗ − i  k X k d 9 d       R X y 8 k e  3 X k 9 N d       R X 9 j R j  k X 8 y d      
 U y X j N R R V  U y X N e e R V  U y X N 3 3 V U R X k d 9 k V  U y X 3 8 3 N V
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